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TRADEMARKS AND THE CONCEPT OF GREATER CARE
The Lanham Trademark Act allows an owner of a trademark, after
using the mark in commerce, to register the mark with the Patent
Office.' Registration is advantageous to an owner because it confers
virtually incontestable rights over the mark beginning five years after
registration.2 Registration, however, is not automatic, and under some
circumstances, the Patent Office is empowered to deny an application?
The proceedings which culminate in a denial of registration may be
initiated ex parte by the Patent Office,4 or inter partes by the owner of
another, previously registered, mark.5 The owner of an existing mark,
in addition to opposing registration of the new mark, may seek an in-
junction prohibiting usage of the new mark in commerce.' In both
registration and infringement actions, one test is whether the new mark
is confusingly similar to a previously registered mark.7 If it is, registra-
tion will be denied or usage will be enjoined. •
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970).
2. i5 U.S.C. § 1065 (1970). See Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair
Competition, 68 HARv. L. REv. 814, 829 (1955). See also note 51 infra.
3. i5 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1970)" "No trade-mark by which the goods of the applicant
may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the
principal register on account of its nature unless it (d) Consists of or compromises
a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent Office or a mark or trade
name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely,
when applied to the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion or to cause mistake,
or to deceive."
4. i US.C. § 1058 (1970).
5. 15 US.C. §§ 1063-64 (1970).
6. The registration of a trademark is challenged by an opposition proceeding. 15
U.S.C. § 1063 (1970). To challenge the continued use of a trademark, an injunction may
be sought in an infringement suit. 15 U.S.C. H9 1114-17 (1970). An opposition to a
registration application is not a charge of infringement, nor is it considered a threat
of such proceedings. Merrick v. Sharp & Dohrne, Inc, 185 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 954 (1951). See also Carling Brewing Co. v. Philip Morris Inc.,
297 F Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
Section 1052, i U.S.C. § 1052 (1958), dealing with registration, referred to any marks
"likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive:' Section 1114, concerned with
infringement, added the words "as to the source of origin." These sections were made
uniform by dropping the "source of origin" language when the act was amended by
Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 17, 76 Star. 773.
7. 15 U.S.C. § §1052(d); 1114(1) (a), (b) (1970); see Stonecutter Mills Corp. v. Um-
versal Overall Co., 379 F.2d 979, 982 (C.C.P.A. 1967); accord, In re Meyer & Wenthe,
Inc., 267 F.2d 945 (C.C.P.A. 1959); L. Nachman & Son, Inc. v. E. Lamer, Inc, 263 F.2d
342 (C.C.P.A. 1959); Kraft-Phemx Cheese Corp. v. Consolidated Beverages, 107 F.2d 1004
(C.C.PA. 1939). See also Note, Confusing Similarity in Trademarks: A Suggested Ap-
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Generally, the'statutory test of likelihood of confusion is interpreted
to mean that the confusion must be probable, not merely possible.,
When actual confusion is shown, it is given consideration. 9 The converse
is also true; the absence of actual confusion is entitled to substantial
weight. It is important to note, however, that the mere presence or
absence of actual confusion is not dispositive of the question whether to
grant registration.10
The factors which may combine to form the requisite finding of a
likelihood of confusion are myriad. For example, confusing similarity
between two marks may arise from their sound," meaning,' 2 or ap-
pearance,13 or from their channels of trade.' 4 These variables are also
examined from the standpoint of different types of consumers. 5 Con-
proach, 55 CoRNauL L. REv. 470, 471 (1970). [Hereinafter cited as Note, 55 CoRNEs
L. REv.].
8. 3 R. CALLMawo, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLmS
S 80 (3d ed, 1969).
9. E. VAImuNBuRG, TRADEMARK LAW AND PROCEDURE 5 5.20, at 140 (2d ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as VANDENBURG]. See also Harold F Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-
Pond's Inc., 176 F Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
10. "The absence of actual confusion is not a controlling factor [because] the
statute prohibits the registration of a mark that is 'likely' to cause confusion." Celanese
Corp. v. El. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 154 F.2d 146, 147 (C.C.P.A. 1946); accord,
Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. Clevite Corp, 324 F.2d 1010 (C.C.P.A. 1963); S.C. Johnson
& Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 266 F.2d 129 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 820 (1959); Salem
Commodities, Inc. v. Miami Margarine Co., 244 F.2d 729 (C.C.P.A. 1957) See also
Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1970); Kelly Girl
Service, Inc. v. Roberts, 243 F Supp. 225 (ED. La. 1965); S.E. Mighton Co. v. La Pryor
Milling Co., 274 F.2d 676 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
11. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 973 (1956); Radiator Specialty Co. v. Ladd, 218 F Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1963);
Comment, The Lanham Act-A Method for the Registration and Protection of a Trade-
miark Plus a Statutory Remedy for False Advertisement, 1966 U. ILL. L.F 1124 (1966).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co, 434 F.2d 794, 800 (9th Cir. 1970);
VAmENBuRG, supra note 9, § 5.40, at 186; Leeds, Trademarks-The Rationale of Regis-
terability, 26 Ga-o. WAsH. L. Rav. 653, 659 [hereinafter cited as Rationale of Regis-
terability]. The factors presented do not comprise an exhaustive list of the elements the
courts consider in determining likelihood of confusion. For another and slightly different
group of factors see 1 A. SEm.L, S. DUBROFF, & E. GoNDA, TRADEMARK LAW AND PRACTIcE
S 22.06 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SEIL].
15. Meyer Chemical Co. v. Anahist Co, 263 F.2d 344 (C.C.P.A. 1959); Armour & Co.
v. Organon, Inc., 245 F.2d 495 (C.C.P.A. 1957); VANDENBURG supra note 9, S 5.40, at 186;
Rationale of Registerability, supra note 14, at 659.
"A competitor entering the market is required only to label his product in such
manner that purchasers exercising ordinary care to discover whose products they are
buying will know the truth and not be mistaken or confused. He is not obliged to
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sequently, it has been held that the likelihood of confusing similarity is
reduced when the goods are sold by a discriminating class such as
physicians or pharmacists,' 6 but a discriminating consumer group alone
will not always prevent a finding of confusion.17
Due to the large number of variables, the determination of confusion
necessarily is subjective.' s Whether a particular mark is thought to be
confusing with another mark is a matter of judgment, and each court's
opinion controls.' 9 Accordingly, precedent is of little moment and a
"plethora of inconsistent decisions" has resulted.2 °
protect the negligent or unattentive purchaser from confusion resulting from his own
indifference.' Rochelle Asparagus Co. v. Princeville Canning Co., 170 F Supp. 809, 813
(S.D. IIl. 1959).
16. Physicians and pharmacists are considered discriminating purchasers. Warner-
Hudnut, Inc. v. Wander Co., 280 F.2d 435 (C.C.P.A. 1960); SEIDEL, supra note 14, at
567 See also Glenwood Laboratories, Inc. v. American Home Prod. Corp., 455 F.2d 1384,
1389 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (Baldwin, J., dissenting); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus,
Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1008 (C.C:P.A. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
17. Morgenstern Chem. Co. v. G. D. Searle & Co., 253 F.2d 390 (3d Cir.), cert.
dewed, 358 U.S. 816 (1958). The court stated that:
[DIefendant concedes that physicians and pharmacists are not infallible but
urges that the members of these professions are carefully trained to detect
differences in the characteristics of pharmaceutical products. While this is
doubtless true it does not open the door to the adoption by manufacturers
of medicines of trade-marks or names which would be confusingly similar
to anyone not exercising such great care. For physicians are human
and m common with the rest of mankind are subject to human frailties.
In the field of medicinal remedies the courts may not speculate as to
whether there is a probability of confusion between similar names. If there
is any possibility of such confusion in the case of medicines public policy
requires that the use of the confusingly similar name be enjoined.
Id. at 393-94.
18. Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc, 438 F.2d 1005 (C.CPA. 1971).
The court stated: "Both sides have, of course, cited many prior decisions on other
marks which, as usual, we find of little help. In the end, it is a subjective opinion."
Id. at 1007-08. Cf. Lever Bros. Co. v. Babson Bros. Co, 197 F2d 531 (C.C.P.A. 1952);
Lever Bros. Co. v. George A. Hormel & Co, 173 F.2d 903 (C.C.P.A. 1949). If there
is any doubt as to whether confusion exists, it must be resolved against the newcomer.
Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1952); Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Stephens, 281 F Supp. 517 (W.D. La. 1967). It has been suggested, however, that the
inquiry need not be subjective. See note 20, nfra.
19. L. Nachman & Son, Inc. v. E. Lasner, Inc. 263 F.2d 342 (C.C.P.A. 1959); Note, 55
CoaRNtEr. L. Rxv. 470 (1970).
20. Note, 55 CoRm. L. Ray. 470 (1970). In Stonecutter Mills Corp. v. Umversal
Overall Co., 379 F.2d 979, 982 (C.C.P.A. 1967), the court stated: "It has been observed
too often to require citation of authority that the question of likelihood of confusion
is one which must be determined on the facts of each particular case." The continued
use of a subjective test often puts speculation and conjecture in the place of truly
representative facts. It was hoped that the Lanham Act would modermze trademark
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Throughout the past 25 years, the nascent doctrine of greater care
occasionally has been determnative both in registration and in infringe-
ment proceedings. 21 The concept of greater care suggests that when
serious consequences would result from the use of one product in mistake
for another, the courts use greater care in their determination of the like-
lihood of confusion.22 Thus, there are two standards of confusion: one
law so the statutes would conform to modem business practices and, more importantly,
that it would remedy constructions of the various acts which had obscured and per-
verted their original purpose. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1946). The
Senate committee reporting on the bill stated that these constructions had become so
ingrained that the only way to change them was by legislation. Id.
Today the courts consistently fail to seek out the only true source of the necessary
information, the consumer. Instead, taking up the role of the guardian of the public
interest, they reject prior decisions and use a subjective standard. See Geigy Chem.
Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. 438 F.2d 1005 (C.C.P.A. 1971) The present judicial
approach has been described as follows:
On final analysis, the determination that confusion is probable, likely or
remote, lies within the exclusive judgment of the court In this
determination, the court is presented with issues substantially at variance
with those that are involved in most other legal contests. The court,
on the one hand, applies legal principles and, on the other, abandons its
expertise in its attempt to approximate the position of the ordinary pur-
chaser. The determination of whether confusion will or will not arise,
far from an exact science, must consider the many variable human reactions
to situations that are really incapable of any exactitude in appraisement.
3 R. CALSarANx, THE LAw OF UNFAIR ComPErroN, Ti zmAiKs AND Mo ooLIs § 81.1
(3d ed. 1969).
Judicial and administrative applications of "the law" hinge on the fact finding process.
In most cases this process is lirmted to a small number of people. Trademark registration
opposition and infringement suits, on the other hand, concern a large number of people-
the consuming public. Since the courts must know the status of the public's mind in
order to determine the likelihood of confusion, resort should be had to public opimon
surveys. See Note, Consumer Polls as Evidence in Unfair Trade Cases, 20 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 211 (1951). Surveys are not new in the field of consumer research. The problems
associated with them-the techniques employed, the questions asked, the universe
selected, and the sample utilized-may be overcome. C. McCoRMcc, HANDaOOK ON THE
LAw OF EvDmENcE 591 n.96 (2d ed. 1972) The role of market research is vital in trade-
mark litigation. There is no other method available to discover confusion than to go
to the market place and "systematically observe and inquire whether it actually exists,
and identify what form-if any-it takes." Comment, Trade-Marks-Secondary Meamng
-Lack of Uniformity in Determining Secondary Meaning, 47 Iowa L. REv. 781 (1962).
21. See Syntex Laboratories, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.
1971); Morgenstern Chem. Co. v. G. D. Searle & Co., 253 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1958); Dietene
Co. v. Dietrim Co, 225 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1955); Cole Chem. Co. v. Cole Laboratories,
Inc., 118 F Supp. 612 (ED. Mo. 1954); Glenwood Laboratories, Inc. v. American Home
Products Corp, 455 F.2d 1384 (C.C.P.A. 1972); Clifton v. Plough, Inc., 341 F.2d 934
(C.C.P.A. 1965); Merritt Corp. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 277 F.2d 956 (C.C.P.A. 1960);
Campbell Products, Inc. v. John Wyeth & Bro., 143 F.2d 977 (C.C.P.A.- 1944).
22. Many of the cases invoking the doctrine of greater care have involved the likeli-
hood of confusion of pharmaceutical products.
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which is applied in cases that do not involve serious consequences from
mistaken use, and another, stricter standard which is used in cases where
the consequences of product confusion would be serious.23 When the
doctrine of greater care is applicable, the likelihood of confusion need
only be possible, instead of probable. This may be illustrated as follows:
Product A has a trademark of XX and product B has a trademark of XY
If a consumer who meant to purchase and use product A were to pur-
chase product B, and if the mistaken purchase raised a possibility of harm,
then the courts would be more inclined to find a likelihood of confusion
between the marks than if no adverse consequences could be foreseen.
Although greater care is of considerable importance, much uncer-
tainty surrounds the concept. For example, the circumstances which will
suffice to activate the doctrine and its concomitant stricter standard have
not been analyzed thoroughly This Comment will define the doctrine,
'examine the circumstances in which it is invoked, evaluate its applica-
bility to registration and infringement proceedings, and suggest guide-
lines for its expansion.
GREATER CARE DEFINED
The Cases
Before a definition of the doctrine can be suggested, it is necessary to
examine briefly several cases in which it has been utilized.24 In analyzing
the following cases two factors should be considered in formulating a
defimtion. These factors are: (1) the degree of harm, if any, which
might result from product confusion, and, (2) the type of product in-
volved-primarily prescriptive pharmaceuticals. These two elements
often appear to be determinative in deciding whether to invoke the doc-
trine of greater care.
23. Historically, "confusion" has meant "source of origin" confusion among pur-
chasers. See generally, Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition,
68 HARV. L. REv. 814 (1955). For example, if a consumer bought Brand "A-i" thinking
that it was Brand "A," the owner of the latter product would lose business and possibly
the goodwill of his regular customers. The intent of the Lanham Act, as stated in 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (1970), "to protect registered marks to prevent fraud and deception
by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable mutations of registered
marks," was aimed at elinunating the type of confusion which damages private entre-
preneunal interests. On the other hand, there is a different kind of "confusion" in the
greater care cases. Where pharmaceutical trademarks are the subject of dispute, the
courts are concerned with the possibility that confusion between the marks could result
in physical harm to members of the public. "Source of origin" is no longer paramount,
since the danger is in confusing the products themselves, and the interest protected is
public rather than private.
24. Only a few cases have applied this concept. See cases cited in note 21 supra.
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The first case to consider the concept, Campbell Products, Inc.,v. John
Wyeth & Bro., Inc.,25 involved an applicant who sought to register the
trademark "Alutropm." The owner of another mark, "Alulotion," op-
posed the registration. Alutropm, an orally administered non-poisonous
medicine, and Alulotion, a poisonous lotion applied externally, were
available only by prescription.
Reversing the decision of the Exanuner of Trade-Mark Interferences,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals denied registration, stating-
"It is obvious that the marks are quite similar in sound and
appearance. Moreover, where ethical goods are sold and careless
use is dangerous, greater care should be taken in the use and registration
of trade-marks to assure that no harmful confusion results. ' 2
The Campbell court held merely that the marks were confusingly
similar and used the concept of greater care only to bolster its conclu-
sion. Thus the case is not solid authority for the use of the doctrine in
registration proceedings. Nevertheless, it has been cited as authority for
such a proposition, and as such, it merits further consideration. 21 To
activate the doctrine, the Campbell court required the concurrence of
two factors: The goods must be ethical, and careless use of the goods
through trademark confusion must be dangerous. The danger to a con-
sumer who mistakenly purchased and used Alulotion instead of Alu-
tropin would have involved death or great bodily injury As an exami-
nation of the subsequent cases will suggest, activation of the concept of
greater care and its stricter standard requires some degree of harm.
However, the other element of the court's standard, that the goods must
be ethical, is not a logical prerequisite. The manner m which the goods
are marketed should be unimportant if confusion would result in harm.
However, if the prescriptive nature of the goods must be considered, it
should militate against a finding of confusion, since prescriptions are
dispensed by pharmacists-a group taught to distinguish accurately be-
tween labels which may appear similar to laymen. Nevertheless, some
courts have accepted the proposition that the greater care doctrine
25. 143 F2d 977 (C.C.P.A. 1944).
26. Id. at 979. An ethical preparation is defined as a term "applied to drugs dispensed
upon the prescription of a dentist or a physician as distinguished from drugs pur-
chased over the counter and sold without prescription." 31 CJS. Etbical at 798
(1964).
27. See, e.g., Glenwood Laboratories, Inc. v, American Home Products Corp., 455
F.2d 1384 (C.C.PA. 1972).
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should, be applied automatically whenever prescriptive goods are in-
volved. 8
In the case of Dietene Co. v. Dietrim Co.,29 the plaintiff sought injunc-
tive-relief prohibiting the commercial use of the trademark "Dietrim."
The products represented by both marks were designed to supplement
low calorie diets. Reversing the lower court decision, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held the marks confusingly similar and
enjoined the continued use of Dietrim. The court, without mentioning
the doctrine of greater care, stated that: "[V']ith respect to products
which may affect human health. ., the avoidance of confusing similarity
of trademarks is vitally inportant."30
Dietene has been cited as supporting the concept of greater care even
though the doctrine was not considered explicitly.31 Assuming that the
doctrine was applied implicitly, the most significant aspect of the decision
is its suggestion that greater care be used whenever the products "may
affect human health." The degree of harm required by this test appears
to be minimal.
The third case to be considered is Morgenstern Chegmeal Co., Inc. v.
G. D. Searle & Co.3 2 In deciding whether the marks "Mictlne" and
"Micturm" were confusingly similar, the court noted "that great care
[must] be taken to prevent any possibility of confusion in the use of
trade-marks." 3 3 *While enjoining the continued usage of the mfrmging
mark, the court did not discuss what harm would result from confusion
of the two products, both of which were medicines. Since the products
were available only by a physician's prescription, the court apparently
believed that some bodily harm could ensue from mistaken usage.
Consequently, the Morgenstern court, at least in the case of prescriptive
medicines, would presume the requisite amount of harm and would acti-
vate the doctrine accordingly.
The case of Syntex Laboratores, Inc. v. Norcwtb Pharmacal Co. 4
supports the proposition that greater care must be given to the question
of'confusion in an infringement action whenever the trademarks repre-
sent pharmaceutical products. In Syntex, however, the degree of harm
28. See, e.g., Morgenstern Chem. Co. v. G. D. Searle & Co., 253 F.2d 390 (3d Cir.
1958). Cf. Clifton v. Plough, Inc., 341 F.2d 934 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
-29. 225 F.2d 239 (8th Cr. 1955).
30. Id. at 243.
31. Merritt Corp. v. Sterling Drug, Inc, 277 F.2d 956 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
32. 2S3:F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1958).
33. Id. at 393.
34. 437 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971).
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was considered. The court noted a significant potential for harm with
regard to each product, such that "product confusion could have dire
effects on public health. ,,35 Furthermore, in considering whether a
stricter standard of confusion was applicable, the court contrasted
another case"' which involved non-prescription pharmaceutical products
that would not have entailed physical harm to consumers even if the
products were confused. Such a distinction indicates that the court in
Syntex was more concerned with a showing of harm than with the
prescriptive nature of the products. Thus, the Syntex court seems to
require severe physical injury as a prerequisite to activating the doctrine
of greater care.
The last case to be considered is Glenwood Laboratories, Inc. V.
American Home Products Corp.,7 where the owner of the registered
mark "Mysoline" successfully opposed the registration of "Myocholine."
The products were contraindicated for one another; serious bodily harm
could have resulted from confusion in the purchase and use of the prod-
ucts. Evidently, the Glenwood court, rather than presuming harm, re-
quired a showing of serious consequences in order to apply the stricter
standard of confusion.
In summary, the courts apparently have taken three approaches in
applying a stricter test. Some courts, such as Glenwood, have required
a showing of harm. Other courts, such as Morgenstern, have appeared
to presume that the necessary degree of harm was inherent in particular
types of products such as prescriptive medicines. Lastly, in some deci-
sions, such as Dietine, it is not clear what was required for the employ-
ment of a stricter standard.
A Definiton
On the basis of the foregoing cases, the emerging doctrine of greater
care can be defined: Courts exercise greater care in their finding of a
likelihood of confusion whenever confusion of the trademarks would
entail serious consequences. The harmful consequences must be physi-
cal, or perhaps psychological, but no court activates the doctrine solely
35. Id. at 568.
36. Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1957). The Upjohn Company, a
manufacturer and distributor of pharmaceuticals, brought an action for trademark in-
fringement and unfair competition against David Schwartz, another drug manufacturer.
The court held that the trade name "Syrocol", for cough medicine, was not so similar
to the registered trademark "Cheracol" as to infringe upon it but that an injunction
would issue based on defendant's unfair competition with plaintiff.
37. 455 F.2d 1384 (C.C.PA. 1972).
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upon a showing of economic injury The requisite harm may result
from a failure to receive the sought-after product, even though usage of
the mistakenly purchased product is not dangerous.", Thus, if a con-
sumer who needs imedicinal product A with a trademark of XX, pur-
chases nutritional product B with a mark of XY, the requisite harm may
be found in the failure to receive the needed medicine, even though the
use of the nutrient would be salutary
Although Dzetene suggests that the requisite amount of harm is sans-
fled upon a showing that human health may be affected, the degree of
harm necessary to trigger the doctrine in fact appears to be more sub-
stantial. The consequences must entail some severe physical ailment or
death. Mere physical discomfort of a short duration probably would
not activate the doctrine. Accordingly, Detne should be considered an
aberration.
The necessary degree of harm apparently may be presumed in certain
types of products, such as prescription pharmaceuticals or medicines,
without an actual showing that harm would result from confusion. The
Morgenstern court adopted this approach.3 9 However, it should be
noted that the presumption, if applied, should be rebuttable, since harm-
ful consequences do not necessarily result from the mistaken usage of
medicinal products. If the presumption is applied conclusively, the
stricter test of confusion could be applied even where its raison d'etre-
the prevention of harm to consumers-does not exist.
REGISTRATION ANi GREATER CARE
The foregoing cases illustrate that greater care has been applied in
both registration proceedings and infringement actions. Although its
applicability in the infringement area is unquestioned, very few cases
have used it as the basis for denying registration.40 Several arguments
may be made against its use in registration proceedings.
38. See Syntex Laboratories, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmaceutical Co., 437 F2d 566 (2d
Cir. 1971).
39. Cf. Clifton v. Plough, Inc., 341 F.2d 934 (C.C.PA. 1965). Both products involved
were medicinal and neither required a prescription, but they were administered dif-
ferently and treated different conditions. In refusing registration, the court held that
"both being medicinal, confusion in application could produce harmful effects." The
court stated -further that "it is necessary, for obvious reasons, to avoid confusion in the
dispensing of pharmaceuticals:' Id. at 936.
40. The doctrine has been utilized in registration proceedings on two occasions. See
Glenwood Laboratories, Inc. v. American Home Products Corp, 455 F.2d 1384 (C.C.PA.
1972); Campbell Products, Inc. v. John Wyeth & Bros, 143 F.2d 977 (C.C.P.A. 1944).
A good example of how the courts distinguish between the right to register and the
1972]
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Commercial Protectin of the Act
Initially it might be suggested that the Lanham Act is concerned with
the protection of commercial interests rather than consumer protection.4
The Act enables a businessman to select, register, and advertise a trade-
mark without fear that an analogous mark will be registered and used
m such a manner as to attract his customers and take advantage of the
goodwill associated with his mark. In order to protect the trademark
owner, courts should apply only a "confusion of source" 42 standard to
registration proceedings; if a consumer would not be confused as to
who manufactured the marked product, then the Act is satisfied and
registration should be granted. Thus, it could be argued that trademark
protection is designed to stimulate commerce and that the Act safe-
guards the public only to the limited extent to which it protects trade-
marks. This argument is bolstered by noting that the Act does not refer
to the doctrine of greater care or to its concomitant standard of con-
fusion. Consequently, a doctrine which is based on the public policy of
consumer protection is inapplicable to registration proceedings.
The chief shortcoming of this analysis, however, is that the Lanham
Act is n6t designed merely to protect commercial interests; it also pro-
tects the consuming public. An eminent trademark authority has stated
that although the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 enlarges the owner's
commercial rights, it also "safeguard[s] the public interest.. ,,4 Fur-
right to use is Tuvache, Inc. v. Emilio Pucci Perfumes Int'l., 263 F Supp. 104
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). The court stated:- "Regardless [of]. which party were to prevail in the
pending Patent Office proceedings, we may expect further litigation in the federal
courts, either by prosecution of the present case or by appeal from the Trademark Trial
and Apped4 Board to a federal district court. . In either event the court would be
required to review the same evidence, and make its own determinations of the issues." Id.
at 106. Professor Derenberg, on the other hand, has stated that in "the view of most
trademark experts ihis distinction [is deemphasized] whenever possible." Derenberg,
The Twenty-fifth Yearof Administration of the Lanbam Trademark Act of 1946, 62
TRADEMARK REP. 393, 456 (1972). See also Note, The Lanham Act and the Right to
Use vs. The Right to Register, 39 GEo. L.J. 294 (1951).
41. "[T]he encouragement of signs of identity, whatever form they may take, stimu-
lates complention by making possible free ch6ice between competing me"ichants."
-Roger's "TbeLanbam Ait and the Social Function of Trademarks, 14-LAw & CONrEMP.
PAoB. 173, 176 (1949)
42. Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607, 609 (2d Cit.), cert; denied,
"546"U.S. 909" (1960); -Brown &-Bigelow v. Eugerie Dietzgen Co., 203 F.2d -764 (C.GTPA.
1953); see also note 23 supra. .1
-4. Derenberg, Tbe Patent Office asGQi-idn of the Public Interest in Tra~de-Wiark
-Registatiob nProceediigs, .14'LAw & Ca 6NEMP.-.PizoB .28gf 289: (1949)- [hreimaftdr7e1jjgd
as Dereiberg]. '2-"
"'Th2idea thlit 1he -Patent Offild-iflust .&onsde" the public interest in -a ± istrihhn" de-
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thermore, the 1962 amendments to the Act manifest a legislative intent
that the test of confusion be applicable to marks which are likely to
mslead a purchaser in any way 44 Consequently, the argument that the
Act is designed only to enhance commercial interests is not tenable.
Overlapping Jurisdiction of the FDA
A stronger argument against the use of greater care in registration
proceedings may be based on Food and Drug Admiistration regula-
tions. The FDA, which is responsible for preventing the marketing of
drugs with confusingly similar labels, does not apply the greater care
standard.45 Since FDA standards successfully prevent confusion, there is
no need for greater care in registration proceedings. Moreover, the
Patent Office is not sufficiently staffed or financed to provide the neces-
sary expertise, particularly in ex parte proceedings, to determine whether
the requisite amount of harm is present.
These arguments are mitigated by two circumstances. First, the FDA
regulations apply only to food and drugs and do not concern other
products which may cause harm to consumers. Also, since one of the
purposes of the Act is to protect the public, the concurrent activities of
termination is not new. Although most commentators agree that "public interests" must
be protected, there is disagreement as to the extent to which such considerations should
govern the course of registration proceedings. It has been said that "[tihe courts have
apparently been more concerned with protecting the more materialistic interests of the
general public" and they "have acted principally in the interests of the litigants"
1 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW oF UFAm ComP-ETIToN, TRADEMARKs AND MONOPOLiES § 3.4, at
91-92, 97 (3d ed. 1967). It has also been observed that the balancing of public and
private interests is a matter for the legislature exclusively. See International News Serv.
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 262-63 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Still another
author has suggested that the Patent Office should not consider public interests until
standards which define the specific interests to be protected are promulgated. Note,
supra note 2, at 890-96. Professor Derenberg's thesis is that the Patent Office places
public interests ahead of private interests. However, is concept of "public interest"
is not as broad as the court's in Glenwood Laboratories. In regard to registration pro-
ceedings, Professor Derenberg states:
It seems that for the purpose of registration proceedings [ex partel the
private interests of the previous registrant are primarily involved and that
the public interest m such situations is not sufficiently predominant to
compel the Patent Office to reject the application in its capacity as guardian
of the public interest and irrespective of the previous registrant's own
attitude.
Derefiberg, supra note 43, at 305.
44. 3 R. CALLmAN, TbE LAw or UNFAmCoMEToN, TRADEmARKs AND MoNopoims
§ 80 (3d ed. 1969)
.4 . See Seligman, Drugs, Trademarks, and the FDA, 26 FooD DRUG Cosm. Lj. 215,
218 (1971).
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the FDA should not reduce the Patent Office's statutory responsibility
Secondly, although the Patent Office in ex parte hearings may be in-
capable of providing sufficient expertise, in inter partes proceedings the
opposing party could be required to show the requisite amount of harm.
Also, the presumption of harm could be applied to certain products such
as prescription drugs.
The Distributing Class
A related argument focuses upon the nature of the distributing class.
In the case of prescriptive products, the goods are dispensed only by
physicians or pharmacists who are taught to appreciate the severe con-
sequences of a mstake and who are trained to distinguish accurately
between similar trademarks. In addition, such products are labeled with
generic names along with trade names, and often are packaged differ-
ently 4' Thus, the likelihood of confusion is reduced, and the need for a
standard of greater care is diminished.
This analysis is not widely accepted by the courts for three reasons.
First, the trade name of a drug which is prescribed by telephone can be
mistaken by a druggist; thus the generic name or the particular shape or
color of the drug's package is of no help in preventing a mistake.47
Secondly, when the prescription is by written message, a pharmacist
may misread the physician's handwriting 48 Again, the generic name
or the distinctive package is of no value. Lastly, even if the argument
were sound, its validity is limited to prescriptive products. Dangerous
consequences may ensue from other products which are not dispensed
by a discriminating class, and when this occurs the need for greater care
is equally compelling.
The Effect of Denying Registration
The major argument against applying the doctrine of greater care
to registration proceedings is that a denial of registration does not pre-
vent usage of the mark or harm to the consumer. The Patent Office is
not empowered to enjoin the commercial usage of a trademark which
has been denied registration.4 Accordingly, it is argued that since the
46. See, e.g., Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus. Inc, 438 F.2d 1005, i008
(C.C.P.A. 1971) (dissenting opinion).
47. Morgenstern Chem. Co. v. G. D. Searle & Co., 253 F.2d 390, 393 (3d Cir. 1958);
R. J. Strasenburg Co. v. Kenwood Laboratories, Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q. 379 (Coir., 1955).
48. See cases cited in note 47 supra.
49. Carling Brewing Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 297 F Supp. 1330, 1337 (N.D. Ga.
1968).
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strcter standard is designed to protect consumers from confusing trade-
marks, and since a denial of registration will not halt usage of the mark,
the doctrine should not be applied in registration actions.5 Furthermore,
absent consumer protection, the doctrine would work baneful results
because a trademark owner may be denied registration and deprived of
the accompanying valuable incidents of registration51 which he may have
gained if the normal standard of confusion were applied. Thus, the
stricter standard would cause detriment to the owner without any
counterbalancing benefit to the public.
A necessary assumption in the argument that a denial of registration
will not prevent usage of the mark or harm to the consumer is that the
Patent Office's determination in a registration proceeding is not binding
on a district court in an infringement action, where an injunction pro-
hibiting usage may be issued. If it were binding, then a denial of registra-
tion would curtail mdirectly the commercial usage of the trademark; a
litigant would only have to bring an infringement suit and introduce
the denial of registration in order to obtain an injunction. Since the
assumption that a denial is not binding is crucial to the argument, further
inquiry into the effect of a denial of registration on infringement actions
is warranted.
50. Judge Rich, in his dissenting opinion to Glenwood Laboratories, Inc. v. American
Home Prod. Corp., 455 F.2d 1384 (C.C.P.A. 1972), stated:
To talk of avoiding confusion in this court by' denying registration is
nonsense because denying registration has little if any effect on use. The
same is true of decisions in the Patent Office. I therefore cannot agree with
the reasoning of the board, approved by the majority, wherein it supported
its decision sustaining the opposition by saying, "it is necessary, for obvious
reasons, to avoid confusion or ?mstaka mn the dispensing of the pharma-
ceuticals" (my emphasis.) Though it cited two of our opinions in support,
the board was erroneously importing into a registration proceeding con-
siderations relevant only to an injunction suit. It has no power to "avoid
confusion or nustake:' Denial of a registration does not have that effect.
Nothing short of an injunction does.
455 F.2d at 1389.
51. The rights conferred upon a registrant by the Lanham Act include:
[A]ccess to the federal courts without having to satisfy the ordinary
jurisdictional grounds; constructive nonce of the registrants claim of own-
ership; presumption of validity of the registration; ownership of the mark
and exclusive rights to its use in commerce on the identical goods and,
services; a "statute of limitations" with respect to grounds for.cancellation,
and invalidity; and a means of excluding importation of goods having marks.
which copy or similate the registered marks.
RzoRT OF PUBLIC ADvisoRr COMmITTEE F OR TERanD i Axlams, Tnni amtu OprnioN
o" TEm UNIT=n STATES PATENT OFFcE, 61 TRADEmA=l REP. 151, 155 (1971).
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Although "[t]he courts have consistently held that determinations
between the same parties on the right to register in the Patent Office
and [the] Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are not binding in in-
fringement suits,"152 many courts give some consideration to the Patent
Office's finding. In subsequent infringement actions, various federal
courts have held that previous Patent Office determinations are entitled
to "weight,15 3 "substantial weight,"54 "respectful consideration,"55 and
the equivalent of no weight.5  Since the courts are not bound by the
Patent Office finding and are divided as to its effect, it is speculative to
predict whether the Examiner's determination will be followed in a
federal court.5 7 Furthermore, in an ex parte hearing, the Patent Office
might not be inclined to pursue the matter in a district court. Likewise,
52. Developments, supra note 2, at 842.
53. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco Rubber Co, 153 F.2d
662 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 722 (1946); Consolidated Cosmetics v. Neilson
Chem. Co., 109 F Supp. 300 (ED. Mich. 1952).
54. Perry Knitting Co. v. Meyers, 120 F Supp. 880 (SD.N.Y. 1954).
55. Carling Brewing Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc, 297 F Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
56. John Morrell & Co. v. Doyle, 97 F.2d 232 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643
(1938); Tuvache, Inc. v. Emilio Pucci Perfumes Int'l, 263 F Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Although the courts are divided over the weight to be given Patent Office decisions,
the Patent Office normally will follow a federal court's decision in an infringement
action. A good statement of the reasoning exercised by the Patent Office is contained
in Squirrel Brand Co. v. Barnard Nut Co., 101 U.S.P.Q. 340 (1954), where it was stated:
Rights in trade marks grow out of their use. Use is a prerequisite to
ownership, and use in commerce by the owner is a prerequisite to registra-
ton. Although the ultimate finding of the tribunals of the Patent Office in
proceedings such as these is the right of an applicant to register, neverthe-
less there must be a finding of the right to use in commerce before the
ultimate finding can be made. The court, in the civil action, will neces-
sarily determine this preliminary question of the right to use, and that
determiation will form the basis of the ultimate finding of the office.
The Patent Office should respect the decisions of federal courts on the right to use.
If the federal courts have held that the use of a product is so confusingly similar as to
constitute an infringement, what can be accomplished by a Patent Office finding that
the product is not so confusingly similar as to deny registration? There is little value
in registering a mark that cannot be used in commerce. This inconsistency was recog-
nized in Westgate-Sun Harbor Co. v. Watson, 206 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1953), where the
court stated: 'We realize that these decisions create a somewhat anomalous situation,
in that Westgate's mark is available for use but not for registration. But Congress
-provided for final adjudication of each of these issues by a different administrative and
-judicial process . " Id. at 460. See also W E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc, 435 F.2d
,656, 662 (2d Cir. 1970); Note, supra note 2, at 842.
57. "The two reasons given for refusal to consider the determinations are that the
,patent tribunals are admistrative.bodies and that the questions presented, right to use
:and right to register, are distinct-. "Developments, supra note 2, at 842.
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in an inter partes proceeding, the successful opposer may not bring an
infringement action because it might cause him more econonuc harm
than good. For example, if the goods were non-competing, courts nor-
neally will not award an accounting for damages58 or attorney's fees."'
Thus, the owner of a registered mark may not desire to undertake ex-
pensive litigation to enjoin the use of a non-competing, but confusingly
similar trademark.
It has been suggested that a demal of registration inhibits trademark
usage because its practical effect is to deny an applicant the rights created
by the Lanham Act.60 On the other hand, since an owner is required by
the Act to use the mark in commerce before seeking registration, con-
tinued usage of the mark after a demal may be m the owner's best
interest because he probably would have incurred substantial advertising
expenses, and the mark may have gained a commercial following. That
is to say, an owner who has expended large sums of money for adver-
tising and who has created a market for the marked product may be
very reluctant to halt the usage of the mark because such actigalwould
inhibit sales of the product. Consequently, it would appear that the
Patent Office's determimation is neither binding on a court in an infringe-
ment action nor determinative as to continued usage of a trademark.61
Thus,,the doctrine of greater care should not be applied in registration
proceedings because a demal of registration will not protect the public,
.but may have the effect of inhibiting commerce,.
CONCLUSION
Although the use of the greater care doctrine m registration proceed-
58. Borg-Warner Corp. v. York-Shipley, Inc., 293 F.2d 88, 95 (7th Cir. 1961); Mor-
genstern Chem. Co. v. G. D. Searle & Co., 253 FR2d 390, 394 (3rd Cir. 1958); Note,
Trademark Infringement: Accouninng of Defendant's Profits in Absence of Direct
Co'mpetition 'ith Plaintiff, 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 983 (1966).. An accounting is an equitable
remedy and normally will not be awarded for noncompeting goods, because no damage
can be shown.
59. ABA CoMeM. ON PATENT, TRADExvrm, AN CopvinonrTLAw § 201 (1972).
60. In Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Dunbill Tailored Clothes, Inc., 293 F.2d 685.
(C.C.P.A. 1961), Judge Martin reasoned that: "Although (the Patent Office] cannot
prohibit the use of a mark, [it] can prohibit registration and all the rights and privileges:
that go with it. Whatever protection this affords the public, it is our duty to give under
these circumstances." Id. at 696.
61. A demal of registration will have some inhibiting effect, even if it is not sufficient
to halt usage. For example, denial followed by usage may constitute an intentional in-
fringement, which sometimes entails larger damages. Also, continued usage after registra-
tion is denied on grounds of greater care may constitute an intentional tort where a con-
sumer is injured as a result of product confusion.
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rngs is of questionable value, it clearly is applicable in infringement
actions. It is an emerging, viable judicial instrument with which con-
surners may be protected from the adverse physical consequences of
product confusion due to similar trade names. When the doctrine is
activated, its effect is to require a closer scrutiny of the likelihood of
confusion between two trade names. A finding of any possibility of
confusion, as opposed to the normal test of probability, is sufficient to
enjoin continued usage of the mark.
The greatest uncertainty surrounding the doctrine concerns the cir-
cumstances which serve to trigger it. Courts have applied greater care
when the products are ethical or when serious physical harm would
ensue from product confusion. The test should require substantial
physical injury before the strict standard of confusion is invoked. If
greater care is applied to all prescriptive goods, it should be treated as a
rebuttable presumption, thus enabling a trademark owner to avoid
commercial loss in instances where there is no possibility of injury to
consumers.
When formulating the nmmal amount of harm required to apply
the doctrine, courts should balance the potential harm to the consumer
against the commercial loss to the owner. For example, if the possible
injury is slight, such as a mild upset stomach of short duration, and the
commercial loss of advertising and good will would be great, then courts
should not activate the doctrine. Instead, the normal standard of confu-
sion should be applied.
Most of the cases have applied the doctrine only when the products
are medicines or drugs. However, the public policy supporting the con-
cept does not require that it be so limited. All products which could
,cause serious harm through trademark confusion should be within the
purview of the doctrine. By focusing upon the element of harm instead
of the nature of the product, the doctrine may be expanded and applied
to other products. Such an expansion will bring the doctrine to its
natural fruition and will serve to protect the public more fully
